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'You know,' said Port, attdhis voice sounded unreal as voices are likely 
to do after a long pause in an utterly silent spot, 'the sky here's very 
strange. I often have the sensation when I look at it that it's a solid 
thing up there, protecting us from what's behind'. 
Kit shuddered slightly as she said: 'From what's behind?' 
'Yes.' 
'But what is behind?' Her voice was very small. 
'Nothing, I suppose, fust darkness. Absolute night.' 
(Bowles, 1990:88-89) 
INTRODUCTION 
It is difficult to conceive how organic expressions of popular justice could 
be preserved in this period of transition in South Africa. It seems unlikely 
that the current State (in the narrower conception of the Gramscian 
terminology)1 would accommodate them, since the general trend is to 
move away from any structure in which the element of popular 
participation is highly visible. 
The National Party controlled government wishes to maintain the 
institutions of the State as far away as is possible from the control and 
accountability of the people. On the other hand, the alliance forces led by 
the African National Congress (ANC) are arguing formally the opposite: 
the people shall govern. Since 2 February 19902, the government has 
initiated many judicial changes. However, these changes still represent the 
dominant culture of the country, where the elites and minorities retain 
control; where democracy is reduced to the right to vote, but does not 
allow the citizen/community to participate actively in the processes of 
decision making. 
The story, thus, is about South Africa. The medium is that of popular 
justice. The motivation is to discuss, at the socio-legal level, the 
implications of this period of transition in the organs of people's power, 
focusing in particular on the institutions of popular justice on the ground. 
The examples are two: firstly, Alexandra, an African township in 
Johannesburg, and its civic organization, where committees of dispute 
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resolution have been established; secondly, a workers hostel of Durban, 
where a people's structure operates to maintain the needed order within a 
population of 10,000 dwellers.3 
The theory is manifold: legal pluralism, informal justice and the State 
interrelating with popular justice. The intention of this 'theoretical 
mixture' is to explore the limits of State law and that of the parallel legal 
modes created by the popular sectors. The relevance of this paper is to 
present the case of South Africa: perhaps one of the most interesting 
current examples of popular justice in a period of political transition in the 
world. A country where two visions of the 'informal' side of the law are in 
conflict. 
In the first part, I will discuss two cases of popular justice in South Africa. 
In the second part I will develop a theoretical discussion; and finally, I will 
present the conclusion to this paper. 
PART I: POPULAR JUSTICE IN THE MAKING: 
SOUTH AFRICA 
Popular justice in South Africa emerged in a clear and distinctive way a 
decade ago. It is an urban phenomenon of the African townships created 
by the apartheid regime. The emergence of a particular expression of 
popular justice, the people's courts, originated during the heyday of the 
revolts against the apartheid regime in the early 1980s. They were part of a 
broader political project of making the country ungovernable, establishing 
prefigurative institutions of people's (State) power, led by the United 
Democratic Front-African National Congress (Allison, 1990). 
The apartheid regime led by the National Party government, used all its 
might to crush any kind of initiative of popular justice (Seekings, 1989). 
The possibility of losing its monopoly on the rule of law and justice was a 
real threat against its authority. In Alexandra, for example, by 1986 the 
State exercised its authority and arrested the leadership that was involved 
in such activity. Specific legislation was enacted to criminalise press 
publicity that commented positively about the people's courts. 
Consequently they were completely banned from public discussion (Sharf, 
1988:19). 
2 (RE)M AKING JUSTICE IN SA 
From the people's side, organizing their own structures of popular justice 
was conceived as a major break away from the State - as a nerve-centre of 
racism and as an oppressive bureaucracy. It gave the people the possibility 
of beginning to regulate and administer their daily lives in their 
communities. However, all is not what it seems to be. Popular justice 
exists in a social reality which does not necessarily correspond to the 
manner in which it is politically represented nor as it appears to the 
participants themselves. Therefore, one has to disentangle the effect that 
popular justice has in relation to the State and other social phenomena. 
Firstly, it intended to break away from State control. The principle that 
State-defined legal problems should be reported to the State's authorities 
has been questioned since the 1980s in the African communities of South 
Africa. Consequently the State's monolithic authority in the administration 
of justice has disappeared. At this level, the people's initiative has a 
political meaning and is a challenge to the State. This is often conceived 
within a traditional Leninist political view, as two poles of force, struggling 
to achieve State power (Santos, 1979).I lowever, judged by these Leninist 
assumptions popular justice failed in South Africa. The whole idea of 
prefigurative State institutions, such as people's courts, did not end in what 
was foreseen. Instead of implementing dual power the current transition 
of South Africa is one in which all the major political forces are negotiating 
the 'modernization' of the State.4 However, if one uses a less orthodox 
(Leninist) approach, and emphasizes Gramsci's concept of hegemony, the 
possibility of creating parallel institutions to the State for questioning its 
authority and power represents just the beginning of a long-term project of 
political transformation. 
Secondly, after initially crushing the initiatives of popular justice in the 
1980s, the State allowed some of them to continue operating. In fact, there 
have been many examples where the South African Police have instructed 
residents in communities not to bring cases to them, but to report those 
cases to the people's courts (Seekings, 1992:193). In so far as those courts 
bring order, reduce crime and reinforce a social morality that is not 
different from the dominant ethical order in South Africa's society, they 
reproduce the State function in areas which lie outside the realm of the 
State's legal arm and where the State's legal/moral authority has been 
thrown into question. 
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Although denying State authority, in most of the cases the communities 
have adopted 'legal definitions' that are a reproduction of those of the 
State, I lowever, in defining certain practices as not acceptable in the 
community, regardless of the fact that they (the community definitions of 
order) coincide with those of the State, the communities have exercised a 
right of autonomy - a right to be free of an undemocratic (central) State. 
The community denies the universality of certain values and places the 
local before the regional; the regional before the national. Is this a post-
modern conception of the law (Santos, 1987)? 
The denial of the State law, and its (re)appropriation at the local level, does 
not deny the need for maintaining order. There is always a definite societal 
need for some kind of order within those who constitute the social tissue. 
But what distinguishes the community initiative from that of the State is 
the participatory element and democratic nature in the definition of such 
order. 
Thirdly, the distinction between popular justice and State justice is not that 
of a revolutionary rupture and a conservative maintenance of the status 
quo. The real distinction, on the one hand, is between State legal 
machinery operating at a distance both physically and geographically from 
the people on the ground, and, on the other hand, popular justice which 
involves local people in exercising legal and moral authority over their 
immediate, community. The substantive issues may well be the same 
between these two forms of implementing justice. But what critically 
distinguishes them is the manner in which they are implemented. 
Fourthly, since the unbanning of the African National Congress and other 
progressive forces last 2 Febaiary 1990, there has been a re-definition of the 
role of the structures of popular justice. In a few consultative conferences 
on the issue (Seekings, 1992:195) , some guidelines were suggested. For 
example, it was recommended that organs of popular justice should avoid 
dealing with cases of murder and rape. The guidelines suggested the total 
elimination of physical punishment. 
These modifications affecting the organs of popular justice are certainly 
important. The progressive movement understood the limits of the 
relationship between practices of popular justice and State intervention. 
Cases of murder with the imposition of a 'people's sentence' of death could 
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also result in members of the people's court being charged with seditious 
crime and murder by the State. Similarly, enforcing other types of physical 
punishment, like whipping, could also represent being charged with 
assault or an analogous type of crime. 
In this sense, the changes in the practice of popular justice have been 
determined by a recognition of the power of the State and its potential 
capacity to intervene against those organs of people's power (Nina, 
1992a:20-21). Fundamentally in this period of transition the communities 
have abandoned the notion of dual power which embodies concomitant 
rights to exercise all accompanying authority in one's own liberated 
domain. What lies behind this shift is a recognition of the legitimacy of the 
State to exercise legal/moral authority in regard to more serious crimes, 
and in return the recognition that organs of popular justice have the 
concomitant legitimate right to exercise lega l /mora l authority in regard to 
other social problems. 
Fifthly, the development and consolidation of organs of popular justice in 
South Africa varies depending on the level of organization of the 
communities (Seekings, 1992). The level of organization is determined by 
multiple factors: the strength of the organs of the civil society, 
consolidation of political parties in those communities, State repression, 
and political violence. 
I have conducted research in two provinces of South Africa: Transvaal and 
Natal. In Transvaal, in the community of Alexandra where I conducted the 
research, the levels of community organization were quite impressive. The 
discussion affirmed the need to maintain the organs of civil society 
independent from, and autonomous of, the political party (i.e. the African 
National Congress) and the State (i.e. governmental bureaucracy). In 
Natal, on the other hand, since the early 1980s there has been a war taking 
place between two political organizations: the United Democratic 
Front/African National Congress and the Inkatha Freedom Party.6 The 
level of development of civil society in the African communities of this 
province is very low. The political organizations are the ones that govern. 
The organization of such communities, therefore, is determined by the 
party political line. 
Since the early 1980s the State has consistently repressed, or attempted to 
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co-opt, different expressions of popular justice in the country. In certain 
places, for example in Alexandra, this made the community drastically 
modify their way of handling disputes. In Alexandra people's courts were 
changed to establishing yard and street committees engaged in mediation. 
Consequently the State eased repression against those communities that 
were not replicating State courts. This coincided with such communities 
beginning to deal with the State authority in a more pragmatic way (Nina, 
1992a). 
In Natal, on the other hand, State repression has been very severe from the 
mid-1980s right through to the present. The reaction of the people has been 
to maintain some form of people's courts (even if only in name) in a 
campaign that represents a defiance of the State authority.7 The most that 
they have done is to eliminate physical punishment and to limit the 
jurisdiction of their courts. 
Sixthly and finally, the communities examined have specific subjective 
elements and the people involved also have specific qualities which make 
the case studies unique. The stability of the communities, the long term 
relationship between yard members or hostel residents, and the rural 
values, create the adequate environment for exercising popular justice. The 
role of the mature activists, of the elders, and the strength of the political 
organization, are also factors to assess. These factors in regard to these two 
case studies, make favourable in this period of transition, a positive 
correspondence between State authority and popular justice. 
In this sense, the external political environment, for example, which in 
Natal exercises a political monopoly of authority, is not able to turn the 
organs of popular justice as mere expression against the State. Instead, the 
social stability, interpersonal connections, existing social mores, traditional 
modes of resolving conflict, inherited forms of respect, that is to say a social 
and institutional fabric derived from a larger, more traditional context, 
imposes itself upon that community and acts as a countervailing power 
neutralizing the political context which is destructive to the community. 
A. In Alexandra, an African township 
Alexandra is an African township in Johannesburg, with an estimated 
population of 350 thousand dwellers. It was founded in 1912 as a freehold 
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place for Africans and Coloured people. In the 1950s, in the early days of 
apartheid, the dwellers lost their rights over the land. This conditioned 
their struggle against the regime as one to maintain their right to remain as 
a community. From its early stage, this community developed a culture of 
struggle and resistance. 
Through its involvement with the UDF in the mid-1980s, the community 
began to organize their organs of people's power. This included, amongst 
other things the people's courts, which were launched in early 1986. The 
State acted quickly against this particular initiative and by the end of the 
year most of the leadership was incarcerated. This impacted on developing 
community structures and during 1986-9 community organization was 
very low (Nina, 1992a). 
Despite this process of repression, in 1989 a new community organization 
emerged, the Alexandra Civic Organization (ACO). The ACO began, in the 
late 1980s, the difficult enterprise of organizing civic structures on the 
ground including the yard and street committees. One of the duties of 
these structures was to develop community mechanisms of dispute 
resolution. 
In the yards (where around 10 families live) residents learned that the only 
way to survive in apartheid conditions of overcrowding, lack of basic 
hygienic facilities and poverty, was through cooperation. Solving disputes 
at the yard level involved educating and politicizing the parties in 
controversy. In theory, the whole civic structure operated on the basis that 
each structure should try to solve their immediate problems: eg., the yard 
was the first step for sorting out any conflicts amongst the dwellers. Lack 
of resolution at this level resulted in the conflict being elevated up the 
structures of dispute resolution: from the yard, to the street, and then, to 
the area committees. I Iowever, in practice people tended to go directly to 
the Advice Office. 
In 1990, ACO established the Advice Office where residents could come to 
report any problem that had legal repercussions, either dealing with the 
State authorities or being an intra-community conflict. In the Advice Office 
a 'community trained' registrar would assess each case on its merits and 
determine the most appropriate solution. For example, if the case was not 
too difficult (e.g. a yard dispute over the use of a water tap), the registrar 
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referred it back to the grassroots structures (e.g. the yard committee) for a 
solution. In other cases, the 'civic registrar' could decide to refer the case to 
the police, social worker, or to a lawyer (including the law clinic of the 
University of the Witwatersrand or the Legal Resources Centre). 
The Joe Modise Camp is one of the 14 areas into which Alexandra is 
divided, corresponding to one of the administrative regions of the civic 
organization. It represents an average population of 12 to 15 thousand 
— people, encompassing avenues 11 to 13, The civic structure of this region 
handles many of the different problems confronted by the dwellers. It also 
serves as a political forum to discuss many current political issues and to 
bring political discussions into line with the ANC's political position, 
although some space has also been gained by other political organizations. 
The yard and street committees are not functioning as ideally conceived. 
The political violence that has affected Alexandra in general since early 
1991 has affected the level of organization on the ground. There is fear 
amongst some of the dwellers of getting involved in the civic structures 
and becoming easy targets of the vigilante groups or of violence from 
Inkatha followers. Nonetheless, the Joe Modise Camp has managed to 
organize and develop certain aspects of community responsibility. The 
proceedings of dispute resolution are very organized in the Joe Modise 
Camp. They are conducted on Tuesday evenings and Sunday mornings in 
the yard where the conflict is happening. For this purpose the region has 
elected a committee of 12 (male) persons to compose a 'rapid dispute 
resolution' body. Between four to six of those mediators are actively 
involved and in most of the mediations in which I participated three 
mediators were always active. 
In the Joe Modise Camp, unlike other areas of Alexandra, the mediators are 
composed only of men: the only explanation given was that women did 
not want to participate in this duty. Nonetheless, in other regions of the 
Alexandra women have taken a very active role in mediation. 
There are two ways to raise a complaint. One immediate way could be for 
any community member of this region to speak directly to any of the yard 
representative of the civic structure or to any of the community-elected 
mediators of the Joe Modise Camp. Depending on the seriousness of the 
case, the representative or the mediator would suggest dealing with the 
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problem immediately or 'booking' it for the next ordinary meeting either 
on Tuesday evening or on Sunday morning. The other possibility could be 
that a member of the community that has a serious grievance against 
another member would go to the Advice Office of the Alexandra Civic 
Organization. The Advice Office would determine what to do with the 
case, and if appropriate would refer the case back to the region structures 
(in this case the Joe Modise Camp) in order for the community mediators to 
intervene. 
The community mediators have not received any formal legal training. 
However, their political engagements in the community and outside of it, 
through the work place, have provided them with many skills to deal with 
mediation. Some of them are teachers, other are factory or construction 
workers; one of the mediators works in an industrial legal aid office, where 
he gained a great deal of experience in industrial relations mediation and 
arbitration. What brings them together is their interest in improving the 
living conditions of their community and creating a democratic society 
where the people would have a participatory role in their daily lives. 
Most of the proceedings in the Joe Modise Camp were conducted 
according to basic common sense. The interest being to reconcile the 
parties in dispute, avoiding any kind of confrontation between the parties 
or other community members. The intervention of the mediators is as 
facilitators of the proceedings and at no time they are interested in 
imposing their will or points of view. What they always emphasize is the 
need for both parties in dispute to feel free to expose their case, without 
any type of fear or coercion. The community mediation encourages the 
participation of other community members who are not part of the conflict. 
The intention of this is to facilitate, with other members of the community, 
the collective understanding of what was done wrong and to find out a 
'collective truth'. No one holds the final truth of any event, but through the 
community's active participation a clearer understanding of the events 
could be found. Punishment of any type is not part of the mediators' 
duties. In fact the mediators are basically interested in finding a solution 
which satisfies the parties involved in a controversy, helping to strengthen 
the community bounds. 
The mediators are at all times in control of the proceedings. No 
participation is allowed out of the established order. In fact, people will 
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follow the proceedings respecting the leadership of the mediators and 
those who are not behaving within the established order would be asked to 
leave the proceedings. From the very beginning of the mediation the 
mediators would define the rules for participating. The identification of 
the mediators with the civic structures as a non-political partisan 
organization in the community is established from the beginning: the civics 
are for representing and defending all the community dwellers regardless 
of their political belief. 
Two 'cases' could help to illustrate my arguments. 
Case I. Conflict over the ownership of a house. The mediators read the 
letter of communication sent by the Advice Office of the Alexandra Civic 
Organization. The mediators explained who they were and their 
intentions. The only rule established by the mediator leading the 
proceedings was that anyone attending the mediation could participate, 
provided that they respected the order of the proceedings. In addition to 
the two parties, the four mediators and the two observers, there were also 
12 members of the community participating in the mediation. 
A, the complainant, put his case forward. His communication skills were 
not too good, thus a friend was assisting him. It was explained that he had 
the right to a shack in the yard. He had started the construction of it, but 
had to leave for his 'homeland' to deal with some family matters. He left a 
friend in charge of the shack. Some members of the yard that were 
participating in the proceedings agreed with A's position. When A came 
back from the homeland, B did not want to move out from the house. 
There was violence between them. 
B claims that A gave him the right of possession over the property before 
leaving the community. B also claimed that he finished the house 
-implying that this made it his. The community mediators were confused: 
they encouraged the intervention of the neighbours in order to facilitate the 
solution of the controversy of the right of possession over the property. 
Many participants intervened saying that A used to lived in the yard and 
that he left B living there whilst he went to his 'homeland'. This helped to 
disentangle one of the problems of the dispute: who was the original owner 
of the shack. It was established, through the intervention of the 
neighbours, that A was the original owner. B agreed. 
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'I'hc; second problem to address was to measure how much was invested by 
B in finishing the shack. B was asking to be paid back or to be able to take 
the materials with him. The mediators went to the shack in order to 
conduct an inspection in loco. After inspecting the place and discussing 
with the parties, it was agreed that A should return to B the materials used 
for the construction of the roof or the equivalent of R400.00. Two weeks 
were given to A in order to satisfy this agreement. The agreement was 
signed by the parties, two mediators and two observers. 
Case II. A, the tenant, and B, the landlady, were having problems: the 
tenant was asked to leave. The tenant, went to the Advice Office to explain 
the situation: she and her family did not have anywhere to go. The Advice 
Office referred the case to the mediators of the Joe Modise Camp. 
One of the six mediators who were in charge opened the proceedings 
explaining the role of the mediators as members of the civic association in 
this region. The civics are representative of the entire community and not 
of any particular political group. The community should engage in sorting 
out any controversy that they have in their own region instead of going 
straight to the Advice Office. The yard representative was attending the 
proceedings. T he yard members were invited to participate in sorting the 
controversy between the parties in dispute that Sunday morning. Almost 
40 neighbours decided to participate. 
A, the tenant and complainant, began explaining her case. She lived with 
her husband and three grandchildren in a shack next to the house of the 
landlady. She rented the house from the landlady's late husband almost 
two years ago. Now the landlady wanted her to leave. A had no place to 
move and she was concerned with the welfare of her grandchildren. That 
is why she asked the community mediators to intervene in order to get an 
extension of her renting contract with the landlady until a new house was 
found. 
Some of the yard members participating in the mediation raised their 
voices of disapproval. The mediators brought the gathering back to order. 
B, the landlady, was given the right to talk. B agreed that her late husband 
made a rent deal with A two years ago for a period of six months. She was 
now asking A to leave because when A went to Natal to visit her daughter, 
the mother of her three grandchildren, the children were left uncared for. 
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On one occasion the children were playing with matches and almost burnt 
the whole yard. This is why the landlady now wanted B to leave. 
The mediators gave the floor to other members of the yard to participate. 
Most of them agreed to not having any personal problem with A, however, 
they were concerned with her lack of care of her grandchildren, her 
continuous trips to Natal and with the incident in which the grandchildren 
almost burnt the yard. The intervention of the community members 
provided the mediators with some further information to disentangle the 
controversy. Although understanding the feelings of the community 
members, the mediators were concerned with the welfare of the children. 
One of the mediators raised some considerations on the housing problem 
in Alexandra. On the one hand A had stayed for much longer than the six 
months period of the initial rental agreement, but the shortage of houses in 
the community forced her and her family to stay there for such a period. 
On the other hand the mediator could understand that the continuous trips 
of A to Natal, leaving her grandchildren unattended, represented a real 
problem to the community. This mediator suggested that a compromise 
should be reach in which the interests of both sides should be protected. 
Fundamentally, the safeguarding of the children was a primary problem in 
this controversy and the 'new' South Africa should always protect the 
children. 
fie proposed a compromise agreement: A and her family should be 
allowed to stay in the yard, for at least six months, until they found a new 
place to stay. The members of the yard should help A's family in finding a 
new accommodation. If A needed to go to Natal, she should guarantee 
before leaving that her grandchildren were under the supervision of an 
adult person -the community should be informed of all the particulars of 
her arrangements with her grandchildren. The agreement was written 
down in one of the mediator's notebook, although it was not signed by the 
parties. 
B. In a workers hostel called Ethekwini 
Ethekwini is a workers hostel of Natal.8 Its history is related to the 
consolidation of the apartheid regime, where the pass laws, group areas, 
and the establishment of the homelands created the conditions for having a 
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pool of African workers migrating into the urban (white) areas, living in 
hostels. Their residence in the urban sectors was temporary: they belong to 
the 'bush', according to the inner lines of the racist policies. 
Ethekwini was established in 1974. It is a hostel housing both males and 
females, with an approximate population of 10 thousand dwellers (eight 
thousand are men and two thousand women). It is controlled by the Natal 
Provincial Authority. The dwellers live six to a room. Some alternatives 
can be provided if the dweller is not prepared to share it with other 
residents or if his/her family come to visit. 
It is mainly a hostel of African National Congress supporters. There is no 
history of Inkatha violence or attempts to move in. There was an attempt 
to create a civic organization of hostel dwellers but it failed. The reasons 
for its failure are, as far as I understand, very related to the political 
patterns of the Natal province. The political organizations at the ground 
level are the ones that determine the organization of the communities. 
There is no civil society as such in the African community of Natal and 
there is a limited development of structures of people's power independent 
from political organizations. 
In 1990, when the ANC was unbanned, a local branch started to operate in 
the hostel. There was also an Ethekwini Committee of Concern (ECC), 
dealing with the daily life problems of the residents. Both organizations 
were accountable to the ANC. Recently the ECC was dissolved and a new 
branch of the ANC launched. This new branch is the one that will be 
taking care of proceedings between the hostel community and the 
administration, and between the hostel dwellers themselves. 
The proceedings of this committee (either the ECC or the new branch) take 
place on Monday and Thursday evening in the recreation hall of the hostel. 
They deal with a range of different matters including those related to the 
Natal Provincial Administration, transportation and the general political 
discussion of the country. They also concentrate on resolving disputes 
amongst dwellers of the hostel. 
The proceedings for the resolution of disputes begin on Monday evening. 
During the night, the dwellers gather in the recreation hall of the hostel 
where they discuss different matters concerning their welfare in the hostel. 
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The attendance of the proceedings varies from thirty people to a hundred 
people. All hostel dwellers are welcome to participate. It is almost a three 
hour meeting, led by a chairperson and a secretary. Towards the end of the 
proceedings, the chairperson asks the participants if there is anyone who 
wants to raise a complaint. On Thursday evening the chairperson opens 
the proceedings assisted by a secretary. Initially the chairperson and a 
secretary for the evening were elected from the floor on a meeting to 
meeting basis. However, with the new changes in the dwellers 
organization, the branch chairperson chairs the proceedings in the evening. 
The structure of the proceedings in the hostel are quite unique. The formal 
court has been reproduced by other means (Nina 1992b]. Lef s call this 
institution a 'people's structure', in which a fusion between the judicial 
practices of the State have been appropriated and transformed by the 
community. The only problem is that there is no judges. The 'floor' would 
have a multiple role: judge, prosecutor, counselor, jury, and marshall of the 
of the people's structure.The chairperson's role is limited to calling the 
complainant to testify and to recount the event. Witnesses are requested to 
leave the hall, whilst the complainant is giving his/her account. Once this 
party has finished the 'floor' proceeds to 'cross-examine'. Then, supporting 
witnesses are called into the hall to explain what happened and be 
questioned. The defendant is then allowed to put forward his/her version 
of the case. The same proceedings that applied to the complainant are used 
in the case of the defendant and his/her witnesses. 
After the 'floor' has listened to both parties (and their respective witnesses), 
they proceed to open a long discussion and deliberation. Has the case of 
the complainant been proved or has the defendant proved that he/she is 
innocent? Were there any mitigating factors? l's there any argument of 
self-defense? After this process of deliberation the floor begins to establish 
consensus on the different aspects surrounding the controversy, leading to 
their final decision. Once the decision has been reached, the chairperson 
regains control over the proceedings. 
The chairperson then, opens the discussion and deliberation for finding an 
appropriate sentence. This process might last as long as that of reaching a 
decision. Many different factors would be considered by the people before 
deciding on a sentence (e.g. self-defence, mitigating factors, etc.). Once a 
sentence has been reached, the 'floor' instructs the chairperson on how to 
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implement it. It could be a matter only of paying a fine to the people's 
structure, or of retribution, or of fulfilling a responsibility to the 
c omplainant. It also could involve giving advice to one of the parties. On 
certain occasions the 'floor' could ask for a physical punishment. 
I Iowevor, at the moment physical punishment is reduced to whipping, and 
it is seldom used. 
In the sentencing that accompanies a decision the 'floor' becomes the 
exeaiter: the process involves everyone participating in the house. This 
was quite clear when imposing (lashes) physical punishment. The 
assessment of the people's structure is that the application of physical 
punishment tends to diminish the legitimacy of their organization, divides 
(he community, and involves the State authority potentially. Therefore, the 
•floor' has reduced its use in favour of other remedies. 
Although the proceedings of this people's structure sounds quite formal 
and rigid, there is also a great deal of flexibility. The 'floor' uses a great 
deal of pragmatism when deciding with a case. A people's 'due process' is 
always guaranteed: the parties must be heard, they are entitled to bring 
there own witness(es), and to raise any defence that could help to explain 
their cases. There is no right to cross-examination, nor a right to legal 
representation. There is a right to not testify publicly if the testimony could 
put the party in jeopardy; but the party would have to testify before a 
special commission of the 'floor1, behind closed doors. 
In contrast with Alexandra, for example, the 'floor' or the chairperson does 
not use time to explain the role of this structure or to discuss the oppressive 
nature of apartheid. The 'people's structure' is determined by the political 
context of the over politicized province. Its primarily role is that of 
dispensation of justice. 
Two cases help to illustrate the proceedings at Ethekwini. 
Case I. T his is a case of a contractual relation between two parties, in 
which one party alleged that the other did not satisfy their verbal 
agreement. A, the complainant, owns a radio-cassette player. It was out of 
order and A took it to B, the defendant. B has a radio repair stall in the 
hostel. He is one of many dwellers who constitute part of a strong service 
sector living and operating within the hostel. 
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A had already paid R 50.00 to B for fixing the radio-cassette. B finished his 
job. A was not satisfied with the job, and B asked for more money to finish 
the job properly. This provoked disagreement and A decided to take B to 
the people's structure. 
After listening to the two parties and raising some questions, the 'floor' felt 
that the payment of A to B was valid and should be preserved. Some work 
has been done in repairing the radio-cassette. However, the 'floor' felt that 
B should examine the radio-cassette again and bring it back to the next 
meeting of the people's structure. The 'floor' would determine if the 
radio-cassette was working properly. 
The following week, B brought the radio-cassette to be examined by the 
'floor'. They found that it was working adequately. A, the complainant 
also examined it and felt the same. A was satisfied. The case was closed. 
Case II. This case dealt with many things including, theft, assault and 
stabbing. It is related to a triangle between A, the complainant who is the 
lover of C. B, the defendant and accused, was the lover of C. C, one of the 
victims of B's attack, was previously having a relationship with B, and now 
is having a relationship with A. 
A argued that he was living with C. One day, when he was not there and 
C was in the room, B came and appropriated money and clothing that did 
not belong to him. On a second occasion B came again, this time A was 
there, demanding to 'have his girlfriend back'. They fought, and B stabbed 
A in the arm. He then left the room. 
B, the defendant had a version not too different from A. He agreed to have 
gone only once to the room where A and C were living. I le went there 
because that happened to be the place where his (former) girlfriend used to 
live. Now he found A living there. I lis relationship with C was not too 
good. B alleged that he only asked for his clothes. However, he also 
wanted to be with his girlfriend again. According to B, A hit him first. In 
self-defence B stabbed A. 
The 'floor' deliberated extensively, trying to identify what the controversy 
in the case was. They concentrated on the reasons for the assault and 
stabbing. The 'floor' understood that no one has a right to invade 
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someone's privacy without the other party's consent. Moreover, the people 
also argued that once you finish a love relationship, a person should 
respect the will of the former lover. The 'floor' agreed that the stabbing 
was done in self-defence (by B) and that it was a superficial stabbing in the 
arm, although they understood that it was wrong. 
The 'floor' thus found B behaving improperly. The chairperson took 
control again, and led the discussion to defining the sentence. Some 
argument came from the 'floor' that could be used as a mitigating factor in 
favour of B. In particular the fact that B and C were seen a few times before 
the incident talking and having a good time. Therefore, there was some 
concern that C, was up to a certain point, responsible for the situation. The 
'floor' reached a complicated verdict: first, that B should submit the knife 
that he used for attacking A to the 'floor'; second, that he pay all the 
medical costs of A; third, that although he denies stealing money from A, 
he should pay a fine (R80.00) that helps to compensate A for losing money. 
In addition to these conditions of the verdict, the 'floor' decided that B and 
C should be advised by the elders participating in the proceedings of what 
the appropriate way of behaving between former couples was. On the one 
hand, B should understand that once a relationship is finished he should 
not go back to the house of the new couple -this could create some heavy 
problems. C, on the other hand, should know that once a relationship 
ends, she should not initiate a new one immediately. 
PART II: POPULAR JUSTICE AND THE STATE 
IN SOUTH AFRICA 
There is a relationship of 'love and hate', as the popular saying goes, 
between practices of popular justice and State law. On the one hand, 
expressions of popular justice emerge due to many reasons related to 
dissatisfaction with the. State law. What is the class nature of the State 
legality? 1 low oppressive is that legal order that moves the people to create 
their own? Are the organs of popular justice always contesting the 
dominant power relations of the State? 
On the other hand, since the emergence of the modern Nation-State, the 
principle of the rule of law as part of the central government has been 
maintained. The law of the State is monolithic over the national territory. 
It represents (reflecting on Durkheim) the common dominant values of the 
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society. Any attempt to create legal institutions that are outside the State 
realm, contesting its authority, would be illegal. The State would exercise 
repression against those initiatives. However, if those initiatives could be 
useful in reproducing the dominant ethic (in the Gramscian terminology in 
which the State, in the broader sense, is a reproducer of the dominant 
ethic), then they will allow those initiatives to continue. The 'rise and rise', 
as Fitzpatrick argued, of informal justice (Fitzpatrick, 1988), could support 
the above argument. 
I would agree with Fitzpatrick's point that popular justice could be a myth 
(Fitzpatrick, 1989). This is basically because it serves to control and 
reproduce the State order in those areas in which the State could not gain 
access. Let's reflect on the case of the hostel, as discussed above. In this 
sense, I agree in principle that the order that is maintained helps in the total 
reproduction of a particular type of necessary order, that goes beyond the 
hostel. 
Nonetheless, and reflecting on the contribution of Guatarri and Negri 
(Guatarri and Negri, 1990), it is important to identify when a rupture 
within the State legality occurs and what it means in the particular context 
that it is taking place. It is an act of defiance, in which the community 
decides to take control of areas in which the modern Nation-State 
traditionally has control. South Africa, however, makes the story more 
complicated: the initiatives of the people to develop organs of popular 
justice, to liberate themselves of the oppressive legal order established by 
the apartheid regime, have been affected by this period of transition in 
which State authority has gained some legitimacy. 
The sociological interpretation of legal pluralism (Santos, 1985), on the 
other hand, suggests that the State monopoly of law is not absolute. It 
represents the dominant legal mode over the national territory; however, it 
coexists with other legal modes which are not necessarily defined 
(although they are sanctioned) by the central State. An articulation of legal 
modes occurs (Fitzpatrick, 1983) reproducing the State's -in the broader 
sense- legality (Gramsci, 1986:12). 
The above argument is important, because the State will rely on the 
reproduction of those different legal modes in order to maintain the 
necessary social control (Santos, 1985; Fitzpatrick, 1989). Foucault's study 
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and perception of the realm of the norms outside the formal law is 
fundamental here (Foucault, 1980). The State, in the Gramscian conception, 
is a totality of social relations in which the State law articulates, in a 
dominant role, with the different legal modes. 
It would be too naive and simplistic to argue that those legal modes, 
articulating with a dominant legal mode originated from the central State, 
are only reproducing oppression and exploitation. The State, in the 
broader sense, is a locus of social struggles, subversions and resistances. 
The hegemony of the dominant class, or bloc, would require certain 
concessions in order to preserve its power and authority (Gramsci, 1986). 
The so-called informal justice, for example, could also be examined from 
the above discussed perspective (see in general Abel, 1982a, 1982b). The 
emergence of informal mechanisms of dispute resolution, outside the State 
official court, could be part of a process in which the State is re-defining the 
boundaries of its hegemony (at least in how to maintain the necessary 
order). Community mediation, arbitration, counselling bodies, and short 
process courts, could be seen as part of a process of decentralization, 
sanctioned (and controlled) by the State. All the logic behind the 
informalism could serve to reproduce the State and its many forms of 
domination and control. 
However, it could also serve to empower deprived sectors and for 
organizing, in Gramsci's terms, a counter-hegemonic project that could 
question bourgeois rule and class legality (Santos, 1977). This is the 
argument that has been raised by Cain (1988) in her seminal work on 
informal justice. There is a possibility, within those institutions of informal 
justice (that are sanctioned by the State), to create a project of 'collective 
justice' (Cain, 1988:56-58). This would represent a break away from the 
State conception of informal justice. 
Informal law is a contradiction in terms so far as the working 
class is concerned. In so far as informal law is law it is destructive 
of collectivity, the only source of countervailing power to capital. 
In so far as informalism does not destroy collectivity, that is in 
so far as it constitutes its subjects in non-individual ways, then 
this informal procedure is not law. It must be some other form 
of justice or of social control. (Cain, 1988:56). 
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Therefore, I would support the informal, the plurality of legal modes, 
articulating with the State mode, if the institutions involved are creating a 
rupture with the State and the ethical system that it repi-oduces. This 
rupture, as the two case studies suggest, could be in form and not in 
content. A system that, amongst other things, is fostering a culture in 
which the collective (or the social aspect of life, paraphrasing Negri) 
determines the philosophy of the legal order. 
I hc experience in India is quite relevant within the above-discussion. Baxi 
has documented the possibility of articulating the formal law and the 
informal law in such a way that a rupture is created moving away from the 
State legality (1985).10 Baxi examines the experience of the Lok Adalat in 
India, where in the region of Rangpur Ashram the empowerment and 
mobilization of the rural communities was initiated. The empowerment 
took place, amongst other forms, through the organization of mechanisms 
of dispute resolution in the community; this process led to the 
consolidation of a 'people's law' (Baxi, 1985:184). This 'law' emerges and 
exists in opposition to State law. However, as Baxi argues, the 'people's 
law' is influential in the enforcement of the State law and its modifications. 
Baxi argues that: 
Recognition of people's law does not necessarily mean denial of 
State law but rather an acceptance of a plurality of legal systems 
and the underlying systems of power and authority. The 
Rangpur experience shows that people's law and people's 
power can be used to reinforce the positive (for the people) 
values of State law as well as to combat its negative aspects. The 
involvement of the Lok Adalat in fighting corruption and 
exploitation demonstrates the latter aspect; the Ashram activities 
in support of the debt relief legislation demonstrates the former. 
In both respects, people's law and people's power are used for 
fostering the values of self-reliant development of the rural poor. 
In both situations, the existenceof a people's court, or moreaptly 
a people's adjudicatory forum, plays a very vital role. (Baxi, 
1985:184). 
In this sense, and bringing together the different theoretical streams of this 
section, the relationship between legal modes and the informal practice of 
the law with that of the State central legality would have to be examined 
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case by case. Each specific case would determine the levels of oppression, 
repression and exploitation that are maintained within the State (in the 
broader sense, representing the articulation of different social forces within 
a particular dominant legal mode). Each will also suggest where the 
ruptures with State law could be aiming toward a new social order which 
is better (more human!) than the previous one. 
South Africa presents the two faces of this discussion. On the one hand the 
State reforms in this period of transition. On the other hand, the 
community initiatives of popular justice modifying the State authority and 
central law. 
Since the mid-1980s, the regime began to make certain modifications to the 
judicial system in order to deal with its crisis of legitimacy and authority 
(at least before the black population). Ihe Small Claim Courts Act (No. 61 
of 1984) was established as a speedy court for small contractual claims, in 
which the parties could represent themselves. This occurred parallel to the 
development by the legal profession of non-judicial mechanisms of dispute 
resolution. Mediation and arbitration outside of court were launched. The 
claims behind both types of initiatives are that they are not expensive (at 
least not as the court), the parties can have a stronger say in their own case; 
and, in the case of mediation, it eliminates the conflict (the one who wins 
takes all) orientation of the court. 
The government has continued this trend today, and it has launched new 
legislation creating mechanisms of mediation and arbitration through the 
so-called Short Process Court (Short Process Courts and Mediation in 
Certain Civil Cases Act, No. 103,1991). The government is also 
re-establishing the institution of the justices of the Peace (the Bill is still 
under consideration by Parliament). It is important to say that the only 
sectors with a right to make recommendations in the selection of judges 
and mediators/arbitrators are the Law Society, the Bar Association and the 
Minister of Justice. The emphasis is on hiring lawyers, former magistrates, 
or people with a legal background. 
These are all reforms from above that the government is implementing in 
order to deal with the many failures of a judicial system which for most of 
the two-thirds of the population lacks legitimacy. However, these reforms 
reproduce a particular understanding of the legal order: it can only be 
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administered by the legal profession and the judges; the participation of the 
people, and by this I mean the community, is non-existent; and the values 
of the system, those that have fomented oppression and exploitation, are 
not questioned, In this sense, this new informalism and emerging 
(recognition of) pluralism of legal modes, is helpful and concomitant with 
broader State interest and the particular order that is beneficial for the 
dominant sectors of society. 
The case of Alexandra and Ethekwini could help in understanding the 
other side of the argument. The collective nature of their justice is what 
makes the fundamental distinction. We are dealing with ordinary people, 
workers, housewives/husbands, unemployed, and marginal sectors, who 
are ingrained in a collective process of decision making. A process of wide 
participation, of discussion and debate. It is also a process from which a 
more clear understanding of the controversy surrounding certain facts 
could be found. A process through which a culture of popular justice is 
created. 
CONCLUSION 
(Re)making justice in South Africa will take much longer than the 
transition from the apartheid regime to a democratic society. To (re)make 
justice in South Africa will mean to democratize the processes of 
dispensation of justice -and those of making law. 
Many tensions will arise in this process between the initiatives taken by the 
government and those practices already being exercised by the 
communities. Moreover, the nature (form and content) of those initiatives 
will determine, from the side of the government, if the 'old' days are still 
alive. From the side of the people in the communities, it might guarantee 
the level of community autonomy, self-determination and democracy in 
relation to the central State. 
A fundamental feature of this period of transition is that the prevalent 
theory of the State is one which does not recognize the democratization of 
the State power. For the government (still representing the apartheid era, 
although now in transition), democracy should not entitle ordinary human 
beings to be part of the administration of their daily lives. The people's 
perception of this is different. The communities that I examined, however, 
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show that even in this period of transition, people are not prepared to give 
away what they have gained in the past. 
Nonetheless, as explained earlier, the main feature of the of the two case 
studies examined, is the lack of interest in achieving State power. Instead, 
in the two communities studied, popular justice has emerged parallel to 
State justice, dealing with certain community controversies which are not 
referred to the State judicial system. Different to State's courts, the 
practices of dispensation of justice and dispute resolution in these 
communities, are embodied by community participation and democratic 
involvement of the community dwellers. 
Finally, I would like to draw the attention of the reader to the initial 
quotation of this essay. For the State, 'the sheltering sky', protects us from 
what is behind it. The State is the sheltering sky. In other words, the State 
is the centre of any initiative that could provide justice in South Africa. In 
that sense, and from its perspective, whatever the communities do, in 
particular the African one, moans 'nothing', 'just darkness', 'absolute 
night'. Contrary to that, I believe that the practices of popular justice that 
are happening behind the 'sky' in South Africa envisage another type of 
society, where the collective, the community, would be able to establish a 
more democratic way of coexisting. 
In those terms, recognizing that in their 'darkness' there is a better future, 
strong support should be given to the articulation of those practices of 
popular justice within informal justice as another legal mode within the 
State. There articulation should be consistent with the development of a 
project led by the oppressed and the exploited that could eventually 
transform the State. When this occurs, one day in the future, 'the sheltering 
sky' would lose its meaning. 
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NOTES 
1. I am referring to Gramsci's conception of dividing the State (in the narrowed sense, reduced 
to the governmental apparatus) in the political society and the civil society (Gramsci, 
1986:263) 
2. 2 February 1990 signals the beginning of a new era in South Africa. It refers to the speech 
: given by President F W d e Klerk in Hie opening of Parliament. He was presenting the 
new agenda for a peaceful transition to a multiparty and non-racist democratic society. 
3. Hie research in Alexandra was conducted between May and December of 1991. Political 
violence since then in the community has changed too much the civic structure. The 
research in the hostel was conducted between May and July of 1992. This paper reflects 
the situation in both communities at the time when the research took place. 
It is important to State that both case studies represent positive examples of popular justice. 
It was not my intention to deal with negative examples of popular justice in this paper. 
4. Suffice to say that since 1991, multiparty negotiations began in South Africa, leading to a 
new constitution and a new elected government in which all the population, regardless 
of their race, will be abie to participate, 
5. Seeking is referring to two conferences organized by the African National Congress and 
the National Association of Democratic Lawyers. Both conferences were held in Natal in 
1990. 
6. This war, which began in the mid-1980s has taken many forms, and taken away many lives. 
It is a war for power. Although it started in the province of Natal, in the last few years it 
has spread to the Transvaal and its immediate impact has been the destabilization of the 
communities (see in general Morris and Hindson, 1991). 
7. In Natal, people tend to call people's court to any structure of dispute resolution functioning 
in the communities, even if such structure does not follow the model of the people's 
courts established in the 1980s. What I have found consistently, are mechanisms of 
community mediation. 
8. Ethekwini is not the real name of the hostel. In fact, this is the Zulu word for being "in 
Durban". For the protection of the dwellers of the hostel 1 could not disclose the name of 
their residence. I am thankful to my research assistant, Mr Nathi Ngcobo, for conducting 
the field work. 
9. Santos' research on Brazil's shanty towns and their non governmental legal system, are 
quite relevant for the discussion on the text (see Santos, 1977). 
10. In addition to the experience of India, also see: Santos on his study of Brazil's shanty towns 
and their non-State legal system (Santos, 1977); and, Sachs and Welch on the experience 
of popular justice in post-independence Mozambique (Sachs and Welch, 1990). 
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